Preemptive search and R&D clustering revisited.

The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering are derived under the specific assumption that firms only can own one patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come about more frequently if search costs are substantial.R&D clustering; Persistence of monopoly;

Lemons, peaches and creampuffs: The economics of a second-hand market.

Economics; Market;

Preemptive Search and R&D Clustering Revisited

The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering are derived under the specific assumption that firms only can own one patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come about more frequently if search costs are substantial.R&D clustering; persistence of monopoly

Financial consolidation and liquidity: prudential regulation and/or competition policy?

A model of loan rate competition with liquidity provision by banks is used to study bank mergers. Both loan rate competition and liquidity needs are seen to be "localised" phenomena. This allows for tracing down the effects of particular types of bank mergers. As such, we contrast the effects of "revenue base enhancing" mergers with the effects of mergers "for market power". The optimal post merger loan rate and risk management decisions are derived. The fundamental trade-off between stability and efficiency is often present, indicating that the approval of bank mergers induces difficult policy choices.bank mergers, merger review process, liquidity, loan Rates

Some Reflections on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Multijurisdictional Antitrust Enforcement in Europe

Kartellverfahren, Gerichtsbarkeit, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Antitrust enforcement , Cognizance, European Economic and Monetary Union

Complementary platforms

We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity.Two-Sided Markets · Complements · The Anticommons Problem

Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints

In this contribution, we present a novel instrument to control for investment opportunities in studying the investment-cash-flow sensitivity. More in particular we introduce the book value of R&D. We argue this instrument has advantages over other theories of investment, especially when focussing on the corporate governance aspects of the investment-cash-flow sensitivity. On the other hand, it implies the investment-cash-flow sensitivity can only be studied in high-tech environments. These have corporate governance problems of their own. To investigate their effect, a signalling model is extended for R&D induced investment opportunities, and estimated on a panel of Belgian data.

Relationship lending within a bank-based system: evidence from European small business data.

This paper adds to the relationship lending debate by investigating detailed contract information obtained from examining nearly eighteen thousand bank loans. The beneficiaries all were very small firms that operate within the continental European bank-based system. That is, with data gathered for Belgium, we investigate price and non-price terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of intertemporal rent shifting by banks. The empirical evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the length of a bank-firm relationship increases the loan rate. On the other hand, widening the relationship by buying other information sensitive products from a bank decreases the loan rate. Thus the effect on the price operates more through the dimension of the relationship than through the length of the relationship. We also find that the length of the financial relationship slightly negatively influences the probability of pledging collateral.

Complementary platforms.

We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity.Competition; Industries; Industry;